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ABSTRACT
Despite a strong interest in entrepreneurship, economists have devoted little attention to the role
of health insurance availability. I investigate the impact of a unique policy experiment—New
Jersey’s Individual Health Coverage Plan—on self-employment. Implemented in August 1993,
the IHCP included an extensive set of reforms that loosened the historical connection between
traditional employment and health insurance by facilitating access to coverage that was not
employer-linked. I find evidence that the IHCP increased self-employment among New Jersey
residents, relative to various sets of comparison states. Consistent with key policy features,
including pure community rating of premiums, I find larger behavioral responses for unmarried,
older, and observably less-healthy individuals.
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Health Insurance Availability and Entrepreneurship
INTRODUCTION
While abundant evidence suggests the availability of health insurance influences labor
market choices like the timing of retirement, there is much less research regarding its impact on
self-employment decisions. In this paper, I investigate the impact of New Jersey’s Individual
Health Coverage Plan (IHCP) on the self-employment of its residents. The IHCP, which was
implemented in August 1993, included an extensive set of reforms intended to encourage access
to individual health insurance, while promoting competition in the nongroup market. Chief
among these reforms, the IHCP guaranteed the availability and renewability of health insurance
purchased in the individual market, while imposing pure community rating on premiums. The
legislation loosened the historical connection between traditional employment and health
insurance in the United States by facilitating access to a potential source of coverage that was not
employer-linked. More generally, the IHCP provides an opportunity to examine the impact of
social insurance on economic risk-taking like entrepreneurship.
Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) from 1991 to
1996, I find evidence that the IHCP increased the fraction of New Jersey residents who reported
being self-employed, relative to various sets of comparison states that did not substantially
reform their individual health insurance markets over this period. Importantly, I also allow the
impact of the IHCP on self-employment to vary by the degree to which it relaxed the link
between traditional employment and health insurance. For example, given that the IHCP
guaranteed health insurance availability and renewability in the context of pure communityrating of premiums, one may expect larger behavioral responses from observably less-healthy
1

individuals on the assumption that they would otherwise have had more difficulty obtaining
health insurance in the individual market. To test this possibility, I allow the impact of the IHCP
on self-employment to vary by smoking status, weight-related health, and age. Consistent with
expectations, I find evidence of stronger relationships for smokers, the clinically obese, and older
individuals. In addition, I allow the impact of IHCP to vary by marital status and find estimated
effects that are much larger for unmarried individuals who generally do not have an existing
source of alternative health insurance coverage via a spouse. That is, I find larger implied effects
for a group that, in principle, experienced a greater loosening of the link between health
insurance and traditional employment as a result of the IHCP.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section provides a brief background on
why health insurance availability might affect labor market choices and motivates why the IHCP
in particular may have affected the self-employment decisions of New Jersey residents. The
third section describes my data, focusing on key variables and my analysis sample. Though not a
traditional source of employment-related information, the fraction reporting self-employment in
the BRFSS closely matches the level reported in the Current Population Surveys (CPS), a more
commonly used source of such information. The fourth section presents my empirical strategy,
which involves before and after comparisons in the context of a difference-in-differences
framework. As alluded to above, I employ various sets of comparison states that implemented
no substantial health insurance reforms over the period in question. In particular, I first compare
New Jersey to nearby Pennsylvania and then sequentially expand the relevant comparison group
to include the mid-Atlantic, the Northeast, and all U.S. states that did not enact major health
insurance reforms in the relevant period. A key part of my empirical strategy is that I exploit
within-state control groups, defined by health and marital statuses, on the assumption that the
2

IHCP should have differential impacts on the self-employment decisions of these groups. This
assumption is supported by evidence and intuition which suggest these groups are more likely to
experience health insurance–related job-lock. In essence, I examine the degree to which the
IHCP, as a source of alternative coverage, “unlocked” health insurance-induced attachment to
traditional employment. The fifth section presents my findings, which fill a gap in the literature
that relates health insurance availability and labor market choices. More broadly, they contribute
to a large literature on the determinants of self-employment and provide evidence that social
insurance encourages economic risk-taking like entrepreneurship. The final section presents a
conclusion.

BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Despite a strong interest in the distribution and determinants of self-employment,
economists have devoted relatively little attention to the role health insurance availability plays
in self-employment decisions. Indeed, there is only one published study on the topic. 1 This lack
of attention is especially surprising in the context of several studies on the influence of health
insurance availability on job mobility. In the remainder of this section, I first briefly review why
health insurance might influence labor market choices, including self-employment, in the U.S.
context. Next, I discuss why the IHCP might have affected self-employment decisions, focusing
on its most relevant features and providing examples of groups for whom the IHCP likely
represented a valuable source of alternative coverage not linked to traditional employment.

1

Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen (1996) examine the impact of health insurance on the transition from
traditional employment to self-employment using panel data. In particular, they compare the characteristics of
individuals who transition from traditional to self-employment with their counterparts who remained wage earners
and conclude that health insurance portability had no systematic effect on this transition.

3

Why Might Health Insurance Availability Affect Labor Market Choices?
As is well known, a majority of working-aged Americans obtain health insurance
coverage as a fringe benefit offered by their employers (Fronstin 2004). Conditional on working
for an employer that offers health insurance, it is generally thought that individual coverage is
more difficult to obtain and more expensive than equivalent group coverage, due in large part to
adverse selection. 2 For example, potential adverse selection leads insurers in the individual
market to engage in medical underwriting, a process by which they attempt to gather information
on the “riskiness” of applicants. Based on such information, insurers may attach riders or other
exclusions on existing conditions, rate an applicant as “substandard,” which results in higher
premiums, or deny coverage outright. 3 Since individuals who leave jobs with employersponsored coverage must eventually forfeit it, the higher costs associated with individual
policies, coupled with potential difficulty in obtaining or maintaining coverage, may discourage
job mobility (see, for example, Buchmueller and Valletta 1996; Cooper and Monheit 1993;
Gruber and Madrian 1994; Madrian 1994b). Such immobility may be especially binding for
individuals who face relatively high experience-rated premiums in the nongroup market (e.g.,
individuals healthy enough to work but considered “bad risks” by health insurers) and
individuals who lack existing alternative sources of coverage (e.g., unmarried individuals, those
ineligible for government-sponsored health insurance, etc.). Finally, note that certain
individuals, like those with long-term chronic health problems or those who anticipate poor

2

Here, I refer to the “loading factor” or portion of the premium beyond expected loss, which is commonly
considered the price of health insurance. Relative to group coverage, the loading factor for individual health
insurance is much higher, on average (Phelps 1997).
3
While there is agreement that such actions occur, there is less agreement over their prevalence in the
nongroup market (see, for example, GAO 1996, 2002; Pauly and Nichols 2002; Pollitz et al., 2001).
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future health, may sort into employment that offers access to group health insurance relatively
early in their working lives.
Why Might the IHCP Have Affected Self-Employment Decisions? 4
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, states enacted much legislation to reform various
aspects of their individual health insurance markets. 5 Between 1993 and 1996, eight states
enacted substantial reform of their nongroup markets that included guaranteed issue and some
form of community rating (LoSasso and Lurie 2003). 6 The most comprehensive of these
reforms was the Individual Health Coverage Plan (IHCP), which was implemented by New
Jersey in August 1993. While the IHCP bundled several policy changes, its overriding goal was
to create an individual health insurance market characterized by competition and access. In what
follows, I describe its key provisions, their intentions, and how the IHCP changed the individual
market in New Jersey. The latter is most important since it has implications for whether, to what
extent, and for whom the IHCP provided a legitimate alternative to employer-sponsored
coverage.
Two of the most prominent features of the IHCP—guaranteed issue and guaranteed
renewability—were intended to expand the size and scope of New Jersey’s individual health
insurance market. As is well-documented, insurers in individual markets may engage in risk
selection, including refusing to issue coverage, or doing so only at very high premiums. While
these actions are intended to reduce their exposure to adverse selection, they may discourage a
4

This section and the next one draw heavily on two papers by Swartz and Garnick (1999, 2000).
Beyond state policy, amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased the tax credit for the purchase
of health insurance by the self-employed. These credits, however, were enacted between 1996 and 2003, mostly
after my main analysis period, 1991 to 1996. Moreover, since they are common to all states, their impact on selfemployment, if any, should be accounted for by year indicators included in all models.
6
Chronologically, these eight states include New York (April 1993), Vermont (July 1993), New Jersey
(August 1993), Maine (December 1993), New Hampshire (January 1995), Washington (January 1996), Kentucky
(July 1996), and Massachusetts (August 1996).
5
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broader set of individuals from purchasing individual coverage. In particular, they may
discourage individuals who prefer to pursue labor market choices that do not entail health
insurance but value coverage. This is especially relevant in the context of forgoing employersponsored coverage, which, if offered, typically is available to all employees, and rarely are
individuals dropped from coverage. 7 To the extent that these provisions reduced the uncertainty
of obtaining or maintaining individual health insurance coverage, they may have encouraged its
purchase among such individuals. That said, it is important to note that this is not required since
individuals may be induced to become self-employed by initiatives like the IHCP even if they do
not purchase health insurance. In other words, given the “guaranteed acceptance” provision,
individuals may enter self-employment knowing that they are now able to purchase health
insurance when desired in the future. Unfortunately, I cannot examine the timing of such
behavior as BRFSS respondents are not followed over time. Moreover, the relevant question
asks only whether respondents have any health insurance coverage and does not distinguish
between coverage types (e.g., group versus nongroup).
Beyond expanding the size of the market, the IHCP contained provisions aimed at
increasing access for persons with poorer health and for whom affordability of health insurance
was a binding constraint. For example, the IHCP limited exclusion from coverage on the basis
of preexisting conditions to 12 months. Moreover, after 12 months with an IHCP plan, the
waiting period was waived if an individual desired to change companies. Perhaps more
importantly, the IHCP imposed pure community rating on premiums, so that all individuals

7

The possibility that individuals who would like to be self-employed but remain in traditional employment
due to uncertainties with the individual market seems especially relevant because consumer information on the
individual health insurance market is not particularly good. For example, Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas (2001) find
that different carriers in the same market treated identical fictitious applications quite differently. In such an
environment, perceptions of difficulty in obtaining or maintaining coverage are likely relevant.
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purchasing a given plan from a given carrier would pay the same rate. Indeed, this differentiates
the IHCP from other large state reforms that implemented weaker forms of community rating.
To mitigate the possibility of losses due to adverse selection, the IHCP transferred pricing power
to insurance carriers, who no longer had to obtain approval from the state to increase premiums,
as was previously the case. 8 Nevertheless, these aspects of IHCP have strong implications for
whose labor market behavior is, in principle, most impacted; I address this issue in detail in a
subsequent section.
To deal with the potential of increased enrollment, the IHCP encouraged entry into the
individual market by requiring that all carriers selling health insurance policies in New Jersey
either offer individual policies or, alternatively, subsidize the losses of those firms that sold
them. This provision was intended to increase the number of potentially competing firms in the
individual market. 9 As documented by Swartz and Garnick (1999) in extensive interviews with
insurance company executives and others, this provision led several carriers, most of them
managed care firms, to consider selling policies rather than subsidizing the losses of other
companies they perceived as inefficient.
Two final provisions—standardization of plan offerings and portability of coverage—
sought to increase competition among firms more directly. As suggested, the IHCP limited
offerings to six standardized plans. These included five indemnity plans with varying degrees of
completeness and an HMO plan, which allowed individuals to trade higher out-of-pocket
expenses for lower premiums and vice versa. 10 While this was an attempt to eliminate “niche”
market behavior, it also may have reduced the information costs associated with the purchase of
8

See Swartz and Garnick (1999) for more information on the politics of this particular provision.
As I will discuss in greater detail, Blue Cross Blue Shield was the major provider of individual insurance
policies in New Jersey prior to the IHCP.
10
More complete policies were characterized by higher premiums and lower out-of-pocket costs.
9
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individual health coverage, while preserving some amount of choice. 11 Such information costs
may be especially important in the individual health insurance market, where very few
individuals participate and policies are often tailored to specific individuals or very small
groups. 12 The IHCP also sought to induce competition by providing for portability of coverage
between plans offered by different carriers within the system. The intention was that consumer
search and potential subsequent mobility would discipline premiums. While plausible, it also
seems likely that this provision would be viewed favorably by individuals whose next-best
alternative is employer-sponsored coverage, since they would not be tied exclusively to any
individual carrier.
Impact of the IHCP on New Jersey’s Individual Health Insurance Market
While the policy itself is quite involved, the relevant question for my analysis is whether
the IHCP succeeded in establishing individual coverage as a legitimate alternative to employersponsored coverage. More generally, did it effectively loosen the connection between traditional
employment and access to health insurance? Relative to the prior regime, where nearly all
individual insurance policies were sold by Blue Cross Blue Shield, the answer appears to be yes,
at least in the short run. For example, as noted by Swartz and Garnick (2000), the number of
insurance companies selling policies in New Jersey’s individual market increased from
effectively one, prior to IHCP, to a maximum of 28 carriers. Beyond numbers, it is clear that the
choices available to consumers in the individual market increased after August 1993. As
mentioned, the IHCP created six standardized plans that involve different levels of
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Many believe that niche markets reduce competition in individual insurance markets since they are
tailored for very small groups and hence not available more generally.
12
There is evidence that standardization of plan offerings improved the functioning of the Medigap market
(see, for example, Rice, Graham, and Fox 1997).
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comprehensiveness of coverage. Of the 17 firms that were selling policies in 1999, 12 sold one
of the five indemnity plans and 9 sold the proscribed HMO coverage with some firms offering
both types of coverage. This differed substantially from the prior regime where Blue Cross Blue
Shield offered only indemnity coverage and individual policy choices were not uniform across
individuals (e.g., smokers were offered different policies than nonsmokers).
Another important question is what happened to premiums following the IHCP. During
its first two years, premiums fell from levels for comparable policies that were sold prior to the
reform (Swartz and Garnick 2000). While the hope was that competition in the individual
market would continue to reduce premiums over time, there is evidence that they increased
modestly over the next two years for some plans and by greater amounts for others. For
example, from Q1:1995 to Q4:1996, the lowest real premium for Plan C, an intermediate level of
indemnity coverage, and the HMO coverage option increased, respectively, from $127 to $146
per month and from $177 to $183 per month for individual coverage. By contrast, the price of
Plan D, which represented the most generous plan offered through the IHCP, increased from
$142 to $194 per month for individual coverage over this period. While the latter increase in
premiums represents an increase of roughly one-third, it is important to note that these minimum
prices were not much greater than average premiums offered via group insurance to employers in
the U.S. Northeast. 13 That said, it is possible that some individuals, including already selfemployed individuals in “one-life” policies, faced higher premiums because the proscribed IHCP
plans that replaced them involved higher levels of coverage and were not allowed to experiencerate premiums. While no data are available, it is thought that these plans were a small portion of
New Jersey’s individual health insurance market (Swartz and Garnick 1999).
13

These figures refer to single coverage. Differences for family coverage were somewhat larger
proportionately. See Swartz and Garnick (2000) for more details.
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Finally, while total enrollment increased dramatically from roughly 50,000 to over
180,000 in the first two years, it declined in the following years. 14 By Q4:1996, total enrollment
was down to about 160,000. Even larger decreases occurred from Q1:1997 to Q4:2001, with
total enrollment falling by roughly half. These declining enrollments suggest that the IHCP has
been subject to adverse selection. Indeed, Monheit et al. (2004) present evidence consistent with
adverse selection in the IHCP. Falling enrollments, however, like the premium increases noted
above, have not occurred uniformly across plans. Perhaps not surprisingly, evidence for adverse
selection seems strongest in Plan D, the IHCP’s most generous plan. By contrast, there is little
evidence of adverse selection with respect to the HMO offering, which itself experienced a
dramatic increase in enrollment in the first few years, followed by roughly constant enrollment to
the end of 2001.
For my purposes, adverse selection is not a large concern. First, even if adverse selection
exists, the individuals responsible for it may be those induced into self-employment by the
reform. In other words, any adverse selection may be driven, at least in part, by the behavior I
intend to estimate. 15 Since the IHCP imposed pure community rating, one might expect larger
behavioral responses among those who would likely have paid higher premiums in the
effectively experience-rated individual market that prevailed prior to 1993. As will be seen, I
allow the impact of the reform to vary by smoking status, weight-related health, and age as
proxies for observable health status. Second, the enrollment declines and larger premium
increases that suggest the existence of adverse selection appear to have not started until after the

14

This paragraph draws heavily on Monheit et al. (2004).
That said, recall that individuals may move into self-employment prior to purchasing health insurance
with the knowledge that it is now more readily available in the individual market.
15
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end of my main period of analysis, 1991–1996. 16 As noted, I vary the length of my postpolicy
period, including trimming it to December 1995, and find estimates consistent with my original
post-period. 17
Whose Labor Market Choices Might Be Most Affected by the IHCP?
While the IHCP facilitated access to an alternative source of health insurance coverage
generally, it is likely that this was more meaningful for individuals who lacked alternatives to
their own employer-sponsored coverage. One example of such a group is unmarried individuals.
While married individuals typically are eligible for group health insurance offered by a spouse’s
employer, unmarried individuals generally do not have this option. By providing access to an
alternative source of coverage, the IHCP likely loosened the connection between traditional
employment and health insurance for unmarried individuals to a greater extent than their married
counterparts. As detailed in the fourth section of the paper, I allow the impact of the IHCP to
vary across individuals by their marital status. 18 If unmarried individuals are indeed more
constrained in their choices and if the IHCP provides a plausible alternative, then a greater
response among unmarried individuals is expected.
Individuals with lower health status form another group that may have been offered
relatively more choice by the IHCP. Such individuals may not qualify for health insurance in the
individual market, and those who do qualify may be concerned with continuity of coverage or
face prohibitively high premiums. By contrast, experience-rating of premiums within the context

16

In my main models, the prepolicy period is January 1991 to August 1993 and the postpolicy period is
September 1993 to December 1996. The prepolicy period is constrained since data on New Jersey residents are not
available in BRFSS prior to 1991.
17
I also extend the length of the postpolicy period to December 2000 in annual increments.
18
This strategy is similar in spirit to papers that exploit the existence of spousal coverage to examine
various labor market implications of health insurance availability (see, for example, Buchmueller and Valletta
[1999], Chou and Staiger [2001], and Madrian [1994a]).
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of employer-sponsored coverage is rare. In conjunction with the guaranteed issue and
renewability provisions, limiting exclusion on the basis of preexisting conditions to one year and,
perhaps most importantly, the pure community rating of premiums may have allowed such
individuals to pursue labor market options outside the context of traditional employment. In my
empirical analysis, I proxy lower health status by whether an individual is a heavy smoker,
which I define as someone who smokes at least one-half of a pack of cigarettes (10 cigarettes)
per day, for two reasons. First, heavy smoking is correlated with higher current and future
medical expenses and, as such, is a characteristic most individual market insurers use to
experience-rate premiums. Second, heavy smoking, relative to even light smoking, is likely an
observable trait. In addition, I proxy lower health status by whether individuals are clinically
obese. Like heavy smoking, excess body weight is an observable characteristic correlated with
higher health expenditures. As such, it may also deter some individuals from making choices
that do not entail access to group health insurance. 19

DATA
I use data from the BRFSS for the years 1991–1996. The BRFSS is an annual telephone
survey of adults aged 18 and older from across the United States. While not a traditional source
for labor market data, the BRFSS collects a limited set of employment-related information,
including employment status. The data have several advantages. Two key features are its
relatively large sample sizes and, more importantly, it is representative of state populations by

19

Though not as directly health related as smoking behavior and obesity status, I also estimate models by
age group. In particular, I allow the impact of the IHCP on self-employment to vary across younger and older
individuals since age is correlated with health status and since older individuals often have more difficulty obtaining
and/or pay higher premiums for coverage in the individual market.
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design. Another important advantage is that the BRFSS collects data on health status and health
behaviors, unlike traditional sources of employment-related information. For reasons discussed
in the previous section, health-related information is desirable since the alternative source of
coverage provided by the IHCP may be relatively more valuable to observably less-healthy
individuals, due to prior barriers in obtaining coverage in the individual market. In what follows,
I compare the self-employment information in the BRFSS to corresponding information from a
more commonly used source of employment-related information. Finally, I describe my analysis
sample.
Self-Employment Status
As noted, the BRFSS is not a traditional source for employment-related data. So, while
respondents are asked about their employment status, the relevant question is very general in
nature. In particular, there are eight legitimate responses, including employed for wages, out of
work for more than one year, out of work for less than one year, homemaker, student, retired,
unable to work, and, of course, self-employed. Moreover, there is no information on multiple
jobs and no information on intensity of work effort (e.g., hours worked per week). Despite this
generality, the proportion reporting self-employment in the BRFSS is quite similar to estimates
from a more traditional source of employment-related information. Table 1 compares the
fraction self-employed in BRFSS to the March Current Population Surveys from 1994 to 1996.
The first column of Table 1 compares self-employment among individuals aged 25–59, which
matches the sample I analyze. Corresponding estimates are quite similar (10.2 percent in BRFSS
and 9.6 percent in the CPS), and this similarity extends across the age distribution with
differences converging to equality with age. While the differences are small, the fraction that is
self-employed is consistently lower in the CPS. This is likely due to the additional level of detail
13

in the wording of the relevant CPS question, which asks respondents about the status of their
main job held in the previous week. 20 As can be seen, these patterns hold for men and women.
The repeated cross-sectional nature of my data imply that I cannot model specific
transitions to self-employment (e.g., from traditional employment to self-employment). 21 As a
result, I cannot pinpoint the source of any policy effect that might be found. This limitation
aside, I avoid two common issues that arise in using panel data. First, relatively infrequent labor
market transitions are likely subject to nontrivial measurement error. Second, my estimates are
not subject to bias from differential sample attrition. This latter point is especially relevant since
recent work finds that displaced workers are more likely to transition to self-employment than
their nondisplaced counterparts (Krashinsky 2004). Perhaps more importantly, this finding
suggests that focusing only on the transition from traditional to self-employment will miss much
relevant behavior. 22 For example, displaced workers may be less likely to transition back to
traditional employment after implementation of a policy similar to the IHCP.
Analysis Samples
The 1991–1996 BRFSS files contain data on 591,723 individuals residing in New Jersey
or another state that did not implement substantial reforms in its individual health insurance
market over the period in question. I limit my sample to individuals aged 25–59. On the lower
end, I intend to exclude individuals who place very low value on health insurance or who have
little attachment to the labor force. On the upper end, I aim to avoid measuring behavior driven

20

For example, individuals engaged in both traditional and self-employment may report the latter when
asked the more general BRFSS question, even if they are primarily employed in a traditional job.
21
As detailed later in the paper, my empirical strategy effectively compares how the fraction of selfemployed changes following the implementation of the IHCP in New Jersey versus Pennsylvania and, eventually, an
expanded set of comparison states.
22
This finding also emphasizes the importance of accounting for economic conditions and, as described in
the section on empirical strategy, I include monthly state unemployment rates in all models.
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principally by retirement-related decisions. In addition to requiring valid self-employment
information, these age restrictions reduce my sample to 382,670 individuals. Given that I
include indicators for missing covariate information, this figure represents my main analysis
sample. Sample sizes corresponding to my three smaller comparison groups (i.e., Pennsylvania,
mid-Atlantic states, and Northeast states that did not experience individual health insurance
reforms) are 18,409, 40,880, and 66,893, respectively. Table 2 presents selected sample
characteristics for New Jersey and my four comparison groups for the prepolicy period.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Given the nature of the policy change, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy. In
principle, one could compare the fraction that is self-employed in New Jersey before and after
the IHCP. However, this information alone may be biased due to secular trends in selfemployment or potential confounders such as changing economic conditions. As a result, a
plausible comparison group is needed. As noted, I use four distinct sets of comparison states,
including the nearby state of Pennsylvania as well as mid-Atlantic, Northeast, and all U.S. states
that did not substantially reform their individual health insurance markets over the period in
question. 23 In effect, I compare the before-after change in self-employment in New Jersey to the
same measure for these four comparison groups. A standard regression-based implementation of
this approach is as follows:
(1)

SEijt = α + ρPOST + ηNJ + γPOST * NJ + X β + τ + εijt

23

My strategy is similar to Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002), who use Pennsylvania residents as a
comparison group in assessing the extent of adverse selection following the imposition of community rating of
premiums in New York.
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In this context, SE represents self-employment status, POST is an indicator that equals one for
individuals surveyed between September 1993 and December 1996 and equals zero for
individuals surveyed between January 1991 and August 1993, NJ is an indicator that equals one
for New Jersey residents and zero for the relevant group of comparison states, X is a set of
individual and state-level covariates, including monthly unemployment rates, that may affect
self-employment decisions, and τ represents a full set of month and year indicators. 24 The
coefficient of greatest interest is γ since it represents the impact of IHCP implementation on selfemployment in New Jersey, relative to that of comparison state residents, who were unaffected
by these reforms. In addition, I estimate models that vary the length of the postpolicy period, as
defined above. All models are estimated with sample weights and all standard errors are
clustered by state.
Building on this basic specification, I estimate the impact of the policy change based on
characteristics that should affect the degree to which the IHCP relaxed the link between
traditional employment and health insurance. I perform two analyses along these lines. First, I
estimate Equation (1) by marital status since unmarried individuals generally do not have an
existing source of alternative coverage via their spouse. Hence, one might expect a larger
average response to the policy among unmarried individuals. Second, I estimate the relationship
by smoking and clinical obesity statuses, as proxies for observable health status, since the
alternative source of coverage provided by the IHCP should be relatively more important to
individuals who may have had greater difficulty in obtaining coverage in the individual market
before IHCP implementation or, more generally, may have anticipated such difficulty. Indeed,

24

I include monthly unemployment rates since previous work finds that displaced workers, whose numbers
will vary with labor market fluctuations, have high rates of entry into self-employment (Farber 1999; Krashinsky
2004).
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unlike the group market, where de facto community rating is the norm, it is well established that
smokers pay substantially higher premiums than nonsmokers. 25 Similarly, one might expect that
older individuals have more difficulty obtaining health insurance in the individual market, so I
estimate the relationship separately for those aged 50 and older and those younger than 50 years
old. 26 Beyond general interest, observing more pronounced relationships for such subgroups
should boost the credibility of any finding that implies increased self-employment in response to
the IHCP.

ESTIMATES

In what follows, I first present self-employment means for New Jersey and four
comparison groups for periods before and after implementation of the IHCP. I then present
regression-based estimates from models that compare the New Jersey experience to those of the
four sets of comparison states. After demonstrating the robustness of my estimates to the length
of the postpolicy period, I estimate models that exploit within-state control groups that, in
principle, should be more impacted by the reforms inherent in the IHCP. In particular, I allow
the impact of the IHCP on self-employment decisions to vary by marital status, age and
observable health status, where I proxy the latter by smoking behavior and obesity status.
Self-Employment Before and After the IHCP

Table 3 presents the fraction self-employed in New Jersey and the four sets of
comparison states before the IHCP and the period following it. In addition to Pennsylvania, I
25

While I examine differential response by groups defined by smoking and obesity statuses, there are other
groups for whom this logic applies (e.g., individuals whose children have chronic health problems).
26
Since age is correlated with health, but is not a direct measure of it, I include related estimates in an
appendix table.
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label the remaining three sets of comparison states as Mid-Atlantic states, Northeast states, and
All U.S. states. Mid-Atlantic states include Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania; Northeast
states include these three states plus Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island; while All U.S. states include all states that did not implement substantial reforms of their
individual health insurance markets. Throughout, I exclude New York, Maine, and Vermont
residents from the relevant comparison groups because each implemented substantial nongroup
market reforms that included guaranteed issue and some form of (nonpure) community rating of
premiums at roughly the same time as the implementation of the IHCP. 27 I define the prepolicy
period from January 1991 to August 1993, and the postpolicy period is September 1993 to
December 1996.
As seen in Table 3, the fraction of New Jersey residents who report being self-employed
prior to the IHCP is somewhat lower than in the four sets of comparison states. However, while
this fraction remains virtually constant over time in the comparison states, it rises considerably
for the New Jersey sample. 28 In particular, the fraction self-employed in New Jersey increases
from 0.0798 to 0.0960. The implied difference-in-differences estimates are remarkably
consistent across comparison groups and range from 0.0133 to 0.0161. In large part, this is due
to the fact that there is virtually no change in self-employment in the four sets of comparison
states over this period. The implication is that the fraction self-employed in New Jersey rose by
between 1.3 and 1.6 percentage points as a result of the alternative source of health insurance

27

I include New Hampshire and Massachusetts in the Northeast and All U.S. states groups since each
implemented similar reforms, but not until 1995 and 1996, respectively. Likewise, I include Kentucky and
Washington in the All U.S. states group because each also implemented similar reforms, but not until 1996. Models
that exclude these states produce estimates that are nearly identical in magnitude and precision to those presented
below.
28
As shown later, the increase is driven by individuals for whom the reform was likely more meaningful
than others (e.g., those without a potential alternative source of health insurance coverage and observably lesshealthy individuals).
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coverage provided by the implementation of the IHCP. Next, I investigate whether these
preliminary estimates obtain in a regression-based context.
Regression-Based Estimates

Table 4 presents my main estimates. In particular, it reports estimates of γ in a
regression-based difference-in-differences specification that compares the New Jersey
experience to the experiences of the four sets of comparison states. As discussed, all individual
comparison states experienced no substantial health insurance reforms over the period in
question. The columns in Table 4 present estimates of Equation (1) that correspond to the four
sets of comparison states. In particular, the estimates imply that the IHCP increased the fraction
self-employed in New Jersey by between 1.1 and 1.6 percentage points—very similar to
conditional mean estimates from Table 3. Relative to an initial level of self-employment of
nearly 8 percent, these estimates represent an increase of between 14 and 20 percent.
Table 5 reports estimates from models that vary the length of the postpolicy period for
the comparison group labeled All U.S. states. The first column of Table 5 presents estimates
from a model that shortens the length of this period to the end of 1995, and the remaining
columns sequentially lengthen it by one year until the end of 2000. While estimates of γ decline
somewhat with additional postpolicy years, they remain practically and statistically significant.
For example, defining the postpolicy period from September 1993 to December 2000 implies an
11 percent increase in self-employment, which is about 60 percent as large as the corresponding
estimate for All U.S. states presented in Table 4. Though not presented, similar estimates using
Pennsylvania, Mid-Atlantic states, and Northeast States as the relevant comparison groups show
a similar pattern, but are somewhat more constant over time.
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Important Heterogeneity in Main Estimates

As discussed, particular subgroups should be more likely to respond behaviorally to the
IHCP. In particular, I posit that unmarried individuals and observably less-healthy individuals
should value the alternative source of coverage provided by the IHCP to a greater extent than
their married and healthier counterparts, respectively. With respect to marital status, unmarried
individuals are less likely to have an existing alternative source of health insurance because they
have no spouse. With respect to health status, it is likely that observably less-healthy individuals
faced, or otherwise perceived, greater barriers in obtaining health insurance coverage in the
individual market. As a result, the nature of the IHCP reforms, which included guaranteed
insurability and renewability in the context of pure community rating of premiums and
restrictions on preexisting conditions exclusions, suggests that less-healthy individuals should
value the IHCP to a greater extent than their healthier counterparts.
Table 6 presents estimates by marital status across the four different comparison groups
listed in Table 4. Relevant coefficient estimates are uniformly larger for unmarried individuals
than their married counterparts, which is consistent with the notion that the IHCP was more
valuable as an alternative source of coverage to individuals who did not have one available via a
spouse. 29 Empirically, this result is consistent in magnitude and precision across all three
comparison groups. There is also evidence that the IHCP increased self-employment among
married New Jersey residents. For example, the Mid-Atlantic and All U.S. states specifications
provide statistically precise evidence that implementation of the IHCP increased the fraction selfemployed among married individuals, though each effect is much smaller in magnitude relative

29

The finding is also similar in spirit to Madrian (1994b), who finds that individuals with spousal health
insurance are more likely to change jobs than those without it.
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to the corresponding estimate for unmarrieds. While not precisely estimated, coefficient
estimates in the other two married specifications indicate similar implied magnitudes.
Table 7 displays estimates by smoking status for my four comparison groups. For each
group, the first column represents nonsmokers while the second column represents smokers. I
label someone as a smoker if they smoke at least one-half pack of cigarettes per day (i.e., 10
cigarettes). 30 I make this restriction since health status differences must be plausibly observable,
and while it is likely that light smoking could be hidden from a potential insurer, it seems
unlikely that this level of daily smoking could be concealed systematically. The estimates in
Table 7 suggest that the effect of the IHCP on self-employment decisions is much more
pronounced for individuals who smoke at least one-half pack of cigarettes per day. Moreover,
estimates of γ for these smokers are nearly identical across the four comparison groups. In
addition, there is consistent evidence of an impact for nonsmokers, as defined, but the implied
magnitudes are smaller than for smokers. These estimates, which suggest that the behavioral
responses of smokers who cannot easily conceal their habit were larger than those of their
nonsmoking counterparts, are consistent with the notion that the IHCP provided a more valuable
alternative source of coverage to a set of individuals relatively more likely to have difficulty
obtaining such coverage prereform. 31
Table 8 presents estimates by obesity status. Again, estimates from models with
alternative comparison groups are presented. Each of the first columns represents nonobese
individuals and each of the second columns represents obese individuals. I label someone as
obese if they report weight and height such that their implied body mass index is greater than or

30

As a result, non-smokers include individuals who do not smoke as well as those who smoke less than 10
cigarettes per day.
31
Though not reported, this set of estimates is not very sensitive to the definition of a smoker.
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equal to 28. While the clinical definition of adult obesity is a BMI of at least 30, it is well
documented that individuals systematically underreport their weight when it is self-reported, as
in the BRFSS, rather than explicitly measured (Cawley 1999). Indeed, my own calculations
using anthropometric data on height and weight from the third National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey (NHANES III)—which was gathered from 1988 to 1994, a period only
slightly earlier than mine—suggest that nearly 23 percent of individuals are measured to be
clinically obese. In my BRFSS samples, roughly the same proportion report an implied BMI of
28 or higher, consistent with individuals underreporting their weight. 32 Using this definition,
estimates in Table 8 suggest that while the IHCP had a systematic effect on nonobese
individuals, the magnitude of its impact was much greater for individuals defined as obese. As
with estimates by smoking status, these are consistent with the notion that the IHCP, as a source
of alternative health insurance coverage, was more valuable to individuals who may have had a
more difficult time obtaining insurance in the individual market prior to its implementation.
Though not reported, I find a similar pattern for overweight versus nonoverweight individuals
where overweight status is attained with a BMI of at least 25.
Finally, though not as directly health related as smoking behavior or obesity status, I
estimate the impact of the IHCP on self-employment by age. In particular, I allow its impact to
vary across two age groups—one composed of individuals less than 50 years old and the other
including those at least 50 years old. As seen in Table 9, whose structure mirrors Tables 6–8,
corresponding estimates of γ are consistently larger for older individuals, though there is some
systematic evidence of a relationship, albeit a smaller one, for those under 50 years old in the

32

By contrast, only about 17 percent of individuals report a BMI of 30 or greater. In any event, estimates
for individuals with a self-reported BMI of 30 or greater produce very similar results to those presented and are
available upon request.
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Mid-Atlantic, Northeast, and All U.S. states comparison groups. Since age is correlated with
health status, and since older individuals often have more difficulty or pay substantially higher
premiums for individual health insurance, these estimates provide further evidence that increased
health insurance availability, via the IHCP, increased self-employment in New Jersey.

CONCLUSIONS

My main findings suggest that the IHCP increased self-employment in New Jersey,
relative to four comparison groups, by roughly 14–20 percent. While not trivial, these findings
are at the lower end of the range of estimates with respect to job mobility and retirement, which
suggest that health insurance availability, in the many forms studied, increases the relevant
behavior by between 25 and 50 percent (Madrian 2006). Consistent with key features of the
IHCP, I investigate its impact on self-employment by marital, smoking, and obesity statuses, as
well as by respondent age, and find that my overall results are driven by the behavior of
individuals for whom the IHCP likely represented a valuable alternative source of coverage not
linked to traditional employment. Estimates for these groups, in percentage terms, lie at the
upper end of this range, consistent with the notion that I am more closely identifying those
whose behavior were actually impacted by the policy.
My findings fill a gap in the literature that relates health insurance availability and labor
market choices, but have broader implications. For example, they suggest that social insurance
encourages economic risk taking like entrepreneurship. Moreover, my findings contribute to a
large literature on the determinants of self-employment choices, which exists independent of the
literature on health insurance availability and labor market choices. Finally, they have
23

implications for current policy, since the most prominent features of the IHCP are consistent
with the types of health insurance reforms debated in the 2008 U.S. presidential election.
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Table 1 Comparing the Fraction Self-Employed in the BRFSS and CPS, 1994–1996
Age Group
25–59
25–34
35–44

45–59

All
BRFSS

0.1024

0.0732

0.1086

0.1258

CPS

0.0963

0.0630

0.1016

0.1238

BRFSS

0.1321

0.0924

0.1403

0.1649

CPS

0.1256

0.0792

0.1331

0.1653

BRFSS

0.0733

0.0538

0.0776

0.0883

CPS

0.0677

0.0470

0.0709

0.0846

Men

Women

NOTE: The figures in the first column correspond to my analysis sample which includes respondents aged 25–59.
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Table 2 Selected Sample Characteristics, Prior to IHCP
NJ
PA

Mid-Atlantic

Northeast

All U.S.

Self-employed

0.080

0.092

0.088

0.091

0.103

Age

39.61

39.96

39.63

39.56

39.44

Male

0.479

0.484

0.486

0.486

0.496

White

0.772

0.882

0.767

0.800

0.790

African-American

0.086

0.078

0.121

0.101

0.093

Hispanic

0.081

0.022

0.070

0.061

0.084

Other race

0.061

0.028

0.042

0.038

0.033

Less than high school

0.070

0.091

0.097

0.091

0.111

High school

0.302

0.444

0.362

0.347

0.336

Some college

0.248

0.202

0.228

0.229

0.263

University or higher

0.380

0.263

0.313

0.333

0.290

Married

0.723

0.702

0.667

0.673

0.705

State unemp. rate

7.67

7.30

7.49

7.60

7.11

N

2,446

4,036

14,520

25,668

145,203

NOTE: Figures are weighted means for the period January 1991 to August 1993, inclusive, which corresponds to my pre-policy
period. “Mid-Atlantic” states include Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, “Northeast” states include the Mid-Atlantic states
listed as well as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island and “All U.S.” states include all states with the
exception of New York, Maine, and Vermont, which implemented reforms similar to the IHCP over the period in question.
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Table 3 Fraction Sself-Employed, Pre- and Postpolicy: New Jersey vs. Various Comparison Groups
Pre-IHCP
Post-IHCP
Difference
Difference-in-differences
New Jersey

0.0798

0.0960

0.0162

----

Pennsylvania

0.0918

0.0932

0.0014

0.0148

Mid-Atlantic states

0.0884

0.0903

0.0019

0.0143

Northeast states

0.0910

0.0939

0.0029

0.0133

All U.S. states

0.1032

0.1033

0.0001

0.0161

NOTE: Figures reported are weighted means. “Pre-IHCP” refers to the time period January 1991 to August 1993 and “PostIHCP” refers to the period September 1993 to December 1996. “Difference-in-Differences” estimates are calculated relative to
the estimated New Jersey difference. Means for Mid-Atlantic states do not include New York, and Northeast states exclude New
York, Maine, and Vermont. All U.S. states exclude the same states as Northeast states since the only two non-Northeast states,
Kentucky and Washington, implemented relevant reforms in 1996, the last year of my data. These exclusions are due to similar
policies being enacted at roughly the same time as New Jersey’s IHCP. See the second section of the text for additional details.
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Table 4 Impact of Health Insurance Availability on Self-Employment
Pennsylvania
Mid-Atlantic states
Northeast states
Post*New Jersey (γ)

All U.S. states

0.0134

0.0136

0.0112

0.0157

(0.0012)

(0.0017)

(0.0031)

(0.0028)

[0.0279]

[0.0020]

[0.0041]

[0.0001]

{0.168}

{0.170}

{0.140}

{0.196}

−0.0163

−0.0157

−0.0120

−0.0265

(0.0006)

(0.0025)

(0.0015)

(0.0068)

−0.0115

−0.0077

0.0016

0.0061

(0.0168)

(0.0131)

(0.0097)

(0.0040)

0.0072

0.0085

0.0096

0.0110

(0.0018)

(0.0017)

(0.0013)

(0.0011)

−0.0001

−0.0001

−0.0001

−0.0001

(0.00002)

(0.00002)

(0.00001)

(0.00001)

0.0638

0.0551

0.0557

0.0586

(0.0092)

(0.0100)

(0.0064)

(0.0033)

0.0128

0.0093

0.0149

0.0053

(0.0008)

(0.0033)

(0.0038)

(0.0033)

−0.0154

−0.0249

−0.0235

−0.0462

(0.0058)

(0.0090)

(0.0066)

(0.0042)

−0.000004

−0.0052

−0.0067

−0.0200

(0.0115)

(0.0089)

(0.0063)

(0.0074)

0.0134

0.0125

0.0109

0.0051

(0.0039)

(0.0030)

(0.0027)

(0.0021)

0.0084

0.0070

0.0033

0.0032

(0.0075)

(0.0029)

(0.0020)

(0.0029)

Dependent mean

0.0912

0.0894

0.0919

0.1028

N

18,409

40,880

66,893

382,760

New Jersey

Post

Age

Age squared

Male

White

African American

Hispanic

Married

State unemployment rate

NOTE: Sample includes individuals 25–59 years old from 1991–1996 BRFSS files. Implied percentage impacts are in curly
brackets; these are computed as the coefficient listed divided by the preperiod fraction self-employed in New Jersey listed in
Table 1. In addition to the covariates shown, all models include indicators for level of formal education and month and year
indicators. Probit marginal effects are nearly identical in all cases. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and correlation of observations within state cells. Corresponding p-values are in square brackets for γ.
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Table 5 Estimated Effect of HI Availability on Self-Employment, by Length of Postperiod
1995
1997
1998
1999

2000

Post*NJ (γ)

NJ

Post

Dep. mean
N

0.0215

0.0118

0.0122

0.0094

0.0091

(0.0022)

(0.0024)

(0.0026)

(0.0030)

(0.0032)

[0.0001]

[0.0001]

[0.0001]

[0.0025]

[0.0071]

{0.269}

{0.148}

{0.153}

{0.118}

{0.114}

−0.0264

−0.0268

−0.0268

−0.0266

−0.0266

(0.0070)

(0.0068)

(0.0068)

(0.0067)

(0.0067)

0.0073

0.0066

0.0063

0.0058

0.0054

(0.0043)

(0.0042)

(0.0041)

(0.0040)

(0.0039)

0.1036

0.1030

0.1027

0.1021

0.1014

308,319

464,315

556,137

654,144

765,895

NOTE: Estimates presented use All U.S. states as the comparison group, though other groups yield substantively similar
estimates which are available upon request. Samples include individuals 25–59 years old. This table presents models that vary
the length of the postperiod, which extended to the end of 1996 in my main models. For example, the model corresponding to
estimates under the heading 1997 add 1997 observations to the analysis sample, and so forth. All models include controls for
age, race, education, and state unemployment rate, in addition to month and year indicators. Implied percentage impacts are in
curly brackets; these are computed as the coefficient listed divided by the pre-period fraction self-employed in New Jersey listed
in Table 3. Probit marginal effects are nearly identical in all cases. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and correlation of observations within state cells. Corresponding p-values are in square brackets for γ.
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Table 6 Estimated Impact of Health Insurance Availability on Self-Employment Status, by Marital Status:
Multiple Comparison Groups
Pennsylvania
Mid-Atlantic states
Northeast states
All U.S. states
(1)
Post*NJ (γ)

NJ

Post

Dependent mean
N

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.0052

0.0341

0.0070

0.0299

0.0043

0.0270

0.0083

0.0328

(0.0026)

(0.0031)

(0.0019)

(0.0029)

(0.0036)

(0.0023)

(0.0026)

(0.0044)

[0.1446]

[0.0293]

[0.0181]

[0.0010]

[0.1367]

[0.0001]

[0.0022]

[0.0001]

−0.0181

−0.0110

−0.0160

−0.0149

−0.0109

−0.0149

−0.0230

−0.0360

(0.0027)

(0.0030)

(0.0028)

(0.0035)

(0.0022)

(0.0017)

(0.0073)

(0.0060)

0.0049

−0.0496

0.0039

−0.0337

0.0085

−0.0135

0.0085

0.0005

(0.0190)

(0.0105)

(0.0160)

(0.0115)

(0.0105)

(0.0143)

(0.0047)

(0.0056)

0.0985

0.0862

0.0970

0.0722

0.0994

0.0756

0.1086

0.0894

241,101

141,569

11,715

6,694

25,388

15,492

41,335

25,558

NOTE: Samples include individuals 25–59 years old from 1991–1996 BRFSS files. Models (1) and (2) report estimates for
married and unmarried individuals, respectively. All models include controls for age, race, education, and state unemployment
rate, in addition to month and year indicators. Mid-Atlantic states include Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and Northeast
states includes the Mid-Atlantic states listed, as well as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. All
models include individuals for years 1991–1996, inclusive. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and correlation of observations within state cells. Corresponding p-values are in square brackets for γ.

32

Table 7 Estimated Impact of Health Insurance Availability on Self-Employment Status, by Smoking Status:
Multiple Comparison Groups
Pennsylvania
Mid-Atlantic states
Northeast states
All U.S. states
(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.0040

0.0502

0.0046

0.0507

0.0022

0.0487

0.0071

0.0368

(0.0018)

(0.0023)

(0.0021)

(0.0013)

(0.0037)

(0.0029)

(0.0029)

(0.0038)

[0.1329]

[0.0147]

[0.0588]

[0.0001]

[0.2852]

[0.0001]

[0.0173]

[0.0001]

−0.0146

−0.0185

−0.0140

−0.0194

−0.0112

−0.0141

−0.0227

−0.0311

(0.0012)

(0.0078)

(0.0023)

(0.0054)

(0.0016)

(0.0052)

(0.0072)

(0.0057)

−0.0074

−0.0257

−0.0053

−0.0171

0.0064

−0.0161

0.0071

0.0029

(0.0113)

(0.0444)

(0.0099)

(0.0304)

(0.0095)

(0.0187)

(0.0029)

(0.0075)

Dependent mean

0.0930

0.0843

0.0907

0.0844

0.0938

0.0847

0.1050

0.0994

N

14,589

3,820

32,639

8,241

53,321

13,572

289,263

82,571

Post*NJ (γ)

NJ

Post

NOTE: Samples include individuals 25–59 years old from 1991–1996 BRFSS files. Models (1) and (2) report estimates for
nonsmokers (which includes those who smoke less than 10 cigarettes per day) and smokers who consume at least a half-pack
(i.e., 10 cigarettes) per day, respectively. All models include controls for age, race, education, and state unemployment rate, in
addition to month and year indicators. Mid-Atlantic states include Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and Northeast states
include the Mid-Atlantic states listed as well as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. All models
include individuals for years 1991–1996, inclusive. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
correlation of observations within state cells. Corresponding p-values are in square brackets for γ.
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Table 8 Estimated Impact of Health Insurance Availability on Self-Employment Status, by Obesity Status:
Multiple Comparison Groups
Pennsylvania
Mid-Atlantic states
Northeast states
All U.S. states
(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.0055

0.0420

0.0083

0.0328

0.0054

0.0299

0.0114

0.0296

(0.0002)

(0.0039)

(0.0025)

(0.0099)

(0.0037)

(0.0082)

(0.0031)

(0.0026)

[0.0118]

[0.0292]

[0.0233]

[0.0227]

[0.0908]

[0.0041]

[0.0006]

[0.0001]

−0.0200

−0.0063

−0.0211

−0.0028

−0.0163

0.0018

−0.0276

−0.0247

(0.0009)

(0.0077)

(0.0022)

(0.0058)

(0.0019)

(0.0049)

(0.0068)

(0.0067)

−0.0216

0.0136

−0.0153

0.0134

−0.0036

0.0172

0.0028

0.0159

(0.0039)

(0.0174)

(0.0128)

(0.0137)

(0.0110)

(0.0086)

(0.0050)

(0.0085)

Dependent mean

0.0928

0.0862

0.0914

0.0833

0.0943

0.0845

0.1041

0.0991

N

13,992

4,417

30,745

10,135

51,186

15,707

287,649

95,021

Post*NJ (γ)

NJ

Post

NOTE: Samples include individuals 25–59 years old from 1991–1996 BRFSS files. Models (1) and (2) report estimates for nonobese and obese individuals, respectively. All models include controls for age, race, education, and state unemployment rate, in
addition to month and year indicators. Mid-Atlantic states include Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and Northeast states
include the Mid-Atlantic states listed, as well as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. All models
include individuals for years 1991–1996, inclusive. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
correlation of observations within state cells. Corresponding p-values are in square brackets for γ.
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Table 9 Estimated Impact of Health Insurance Availability on Self-Employment Status, by Age: Multiple
Comparison Groups
Pennsylvania
Mid-Atlantic states
Northeast states
All U.S. states
(1)
Post*NJ (γ)

NJ

Post

Dependent mean
N

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.0047

0.0450

0.0088

0.0321

0.0084

0.0194

0.0118

0.0302

(0.0037)

(0.0085)

(0.0023)

(0.0097)

(0.0033)

(0.0141)

(0.0030)

(0.0038)

[0.2127]

[0.0592]

[0.0156]

[0.0313]

[0.0192]

[0.1058]

[0.0002]

[0.0001]

−0.0142

−0.0242

−0.0144

−0.0207

−0.0155

0.0053

−0.0256

−0.0281

(0.0023)

(0.0060)

(0.0033)

(0.0097)

(0.0022)

(0.0146)

(0.0066)

(0.0073)

−0.0073

−0.0252

−0.0085

−0.0043

0.0039

−0.0090

0.0097

−0.0084

(0.0232)

(0.0101)

(0.0199)

(0.0239)

(0.0139)

(0.0208)

(0.0052)

(0.0073)

0.0864

0.1103

0.0857

0.1043

0.0889

0.1045

0.0975

0.1251

14,853

3,556

33,005

7,875

54,436

12,457

309,019

73,651

NOTE: Models (1) and (2) report estimates for individuals less than 50 years old and at least 50 years old, respectively. All
models include controls for age, race, education, and state unemployment rate, in addition to month and year indicators. MidAtlantic states include Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and Northeast states include the Mid-Atlantic states listed, as well
as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. All models include individuals for years 1991–1996,
inclusive. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation of observations within state cells.
Corresponding p-values are in square brackets for γ.
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